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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction of this appeal under the 
provisions of Section 78-2-2(3)(j) Utah Code Ann. (1989) and 
Rule 3(a) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This is an appeal from the entry of Amended Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and an Amended Judgment entered by the 
Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen, First Judicial District Judge, 
following a remand by the Utah Supreme Court. See Cornish v. 
Roller, 758 P.2d 919 (Utah 1988). Upon remand, the trial court 
amended paragraph 5 of its Findings of Fact regarding the 
location of Evan 0. and Marlene B. Roller's ("Rollers") tap 
into the Cornish Town ("Cornish") water line. The court also 
made other revisions and modifications to the Findings of Fact 
at the request of counsel for Rollers. On December 15, 1988, 
the court entered Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and an Amended Judgment incorporating revisions thereto advanced 
by both plaintiff and defendant. Written objections were made 
to Amended Finding of Fact No. 5 by Rollers. The trial court 
denied Roller's motion objecting to the entry of the Amended 
Findings of Fact. The Rollers thereafter filed a Notice of 
Appeal. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issue presented on appeal is whether the trial court 
erred in modifying its Findings of Fact to further interpret 
the deed and further clarify the obligation of Cornish with 
respect to the deed. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This is an appeal from an amended final judgment and 
specifically from Amended Finding of Fact No. 5 entered by the 
First Judicial District Court on December 15, 1988. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition at the District 
Court. 
In 1979, Cornish initiated an action against the 
Kollers to determine the ownership of culinary water used by 
Cornish and the Kollers from springs situated on the Kollers1 
property. The case was tried to the court without a jury on 
February 16, 17 and 18, 1983. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and a Judgment were entered on April 26, 1984. The trial 
court found that Cornish had the right to determine whether 
Kollers should be supplied water from the town's water supply 
or from the spring from which Rollers1 reservation of use in a 
deed was made. 
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Rollers appealed, inter alia, this finding of the district 
court. On appeal, this Court affirmed the trial court relative 
to all issues except the finding of the trial court relative to 
the source from which the Rollers1 water must be supplied. This 
Court held that the Rollers' predecessors reserved in themselves 
rights in the water which was the subject of the conveyance by 
deed, namely, the water flowing from the Pearson Spring. Ld. 
at 921. The Court found that Cornish must provide Rollers with 
water from the Pearson Spring and not other sources of water 
and remanded the matter to the district court. Following the 
remand, the present dispute between the parties, which is the 
subject of this appeal, arose in the course of proposed 
amendments to the Findings of Fact. A detailed description of 
this dispute is set forth in the Statement of Facts, which 
follows. 
C. Statement of Facts. 
The disagreement over water rights between Cornish and the 
Rollers is long-standing. Although the trial court entered 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in this case on 
April 26, 1984, the trial court continued to exercise 
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jurisdiction over various aspects of this case during the 
pendency of the appeal.1 
Following the remand by this Court, the trial court held a 
further hearing on November 15, 1988. In the morning, the court 
held an evidentiary hearing with respect to the effect of the 
court1s prior ruling in its August 30, 1988 Memorandum Decision 
that the Rollers replace the two-inch pipe with a one-inch 
pipe. Rollers put on evidence about various issues involving 
the size of the pipe and pressure requirements. (See Transcript 
of Hearing, November 15, 1988, 10:00 a.m., p. 1-92) 
•^For example, on August 21, 1987, Rollers filed a motion for 
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction which 
was later heard. (See Motion for Temporary Restraining Order 
and Preliminary Injunction dated August 21, 1987) On July 12, 
1988, Cornish sought further clarification from the court 
regarding the extent of Roller's water rights and sought by 
motion for permanent injunction to have the court establish 
some quantifiable limit on the amount of Rollers1 use of water 
from the-Pearson and Griffiths Springs. (See Motion for 
Permanent Injunction, dated July 12, 1989) This motion did not 
seek to disturb the order on appeal to this Court but involved 
different issues. On July 26, 1989, Rollers filed a motion to 
dismiss the motion for permanent injunction. (See Defendants1 
Motion to Dismiss and memorandum of Law, dated July 26, 1988) 
The trial court also held an evidentiary hearing on these 
motions during the pendency of the appeal. In a Memorandum 
Decision dated August 30, 1989, the court granted the Town's 
motion for an injunction to the extent that the Rollers were 
ordered to restore the Griffith Spring source back to where it 
was at the time they were granted a right to tap that supply. 
(See Court's Memorandum Decision, entered August 30, 1988) 
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During the afternoon of November 15, 1988, the court heard 
argument about the proposed amendments to the Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law and objections thereto. Contrary to 
Rollers statement of facts, the Rollers proposed substantive 
amendments to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law which 
were not simply attempts to correct "clerical error." (See 
Rollers Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
Cornish's Objections to Defendants Proposed Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law; see illustratively paragraphs 3, 14, 
16, 17, 21 and 27 of the proposed findings of fact; and para-
graphs 3, 4 and 5 of the proposed conclusions of law.) Cornish 
objected to certain of these proposed amendments and the court 
made its rulings on the record. (See Transcript of Hearing on 
November 15, 1988, 3:00 p.m. (hereinafter "Transcript") p.1-55) 
At the hearing, counsel for Cornish orally moved to make an 
additional finding of fact clarifying where the tap for the 
diversion of water to the Rollers is required to be located 
based upon the language of the deed. (Transcript, p. 5) 
Counsel for Rollers objected to this motion on the grounds that 
it had not been brought prior to the hearing. The court 
indicated that it would prefer to resolve the issue at that 
time. (Transcript, p. 5) 
Cornish pointed out that the deed simply states: "Grantors 
reserve the right to use water for human drinking and stock 
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watering purposes. This use to be confined to a water flow 
through a 3/4" tap, and grantee agrees to pipe the said water 
to the home of Lars Pearson for culinary and domestic 
purposes." (See Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, p. 4) Cornish argued that the deed was silent on where 
the 3/4 inch tap had to be placed vis-a-vis the home. 
Furthermore, it argued the Supreme Court's decision did not 
address this issue but merely required that Cornish provide the 
required water from the Pearson Spring. Cornish indicated that 
it wanted to place the tap at a different location on the brow 
of a hill as part of a new diversion box that would accomplish 
both the diversion of the one-fifth interest Rollers were 
entitled to and provide for the tap at the same time. 
(Transcript, pp. 6-8) Rollers objected to this amendment, 
arguing that Cornish was obligated to furnish the tap at the 
home of Lars Pearson (now Rollers ) and that the court 
previously made a finding of fact that the tap was to be 50 
feet west of the residence. (Transcript, pp. 7, 19) 
The court observed that the fact the tap was located 50 
feet west of the residence was not a finding of where the tap 
had to be located but merely reflected where the parties told 
the court the tap was located at the time of the original 
proceeding. (Transcript, p. 18) The court found that Cornish 
was only required to provide a 3/4 inch tap and that tap had to 
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come out of the Pearson Spring, but that the tap was not re-
quired to be located 50 feet west of the residence. 
(Transcript, p. 5, 18-20) 
After hearing the argument of both sides and making its 
ruling, the court thereafter added language to the end of 
paragraph 5 of the original Findings of Fact. Paragraph 5 of 
the Amended Findings of Fact now states: 
5. Defendants1 Predecessor in interest reserved 
the right to use water for human drinking and stock 
watering purposes. This use to be confined to a water 
flow through a 3/4 inch tap and Grantees (Cornish) 
agreed to pipe the said water to the home of Lars 
Pearson, Defendants predecessor, for culinary and 
domestic purposes. All water to be measured through a 
culinary water meter. The tap is presently situated 
approximately 50 feet West of the Defendants 
residence. However, as long as Cornish provides the 
water through a 3/4 inch tap from the Pearson Spring, 
that complies with the deed, regardless of where the 
tap is located in relation to the residence. 
(Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, entered 
December*15, 1989 - Language which was added by the court and 
is the subject of this appeal emphasized.) 
The Rollers filed a notice of appeal on January 12, 1989 
from the district court's judgment entered on December 15, 
1989. Specifically, the Rollers appealed from the district 
court's addition of the above-referenced language to paragraph 
5 of the Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
When the district court amended Finding of Fact No. 5 to 
address the location of the tap, it determined an issue not 
previously raised by the parties. The court appropriately 
interpreted the deed with respect to the issue of whether it 
required the tap to be located 50 feet west of the residence. 
The court had power, on remand, to make this additional finding 
since it was not inconsistent with the mandate of this Court. 
The district court's judgment should be affirmed; it clearly 
acted within its power in making the additional finding. The 
Rollers1 arguments that Cornish is collaterally estopped from 
raising this issue, or that law of the case, or procedural 
rules were violated are erroneous. Collateral estoppel does 
not apply since there was not a prior final judgment, and even 
if there was, the issue of the location of the tap was not 
previously considered and certainly not actually litigated 
before. Law of the case likewise does not apply since it only 
relates to issues previously determined. The mere reference by 
the court in 1984 in its original Findings of Fact, to the 
presently existing fact of the location of the tap, did not 
constitute a determination of whether the deed required the tap 
to be located at that spot. The Rollers1 reliance on 
procedural rules is also misplaced since the Rollers had an 
opportunity to present their arguments at the November 15, 1988 
hearing and the court gave them a full opportunity to be heard. 
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Finally, in the alternative, even if this Court determines that 
a final judgment was present and the court could not make 
additional findings on remand, the trial court had power under 
Rule 60(b) to grant the relief requested by Cornish. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE TRIAL COURT 
SINCE THE TRIAL COURT CLEARLY ACTED WITHIN 
ITS POWER IN MAKING ADDITIONAL FACTUAL 
FINDINGS AFTER REMAND 
The Rollers contend that the trial court had no authority 
to enter the additional finding of fact it made at the hearing 
on November 15, 1988 when, at that same hearing, Rollers 
suggested numerous changes in the Findings of Fact and Judgment 
that were clearly of the same type and nature as that suggested 
by Cornish. Many of the changes proposed by Rollers were not 
merely "clerical errors", as they contend, nor had they any 
relationship to the subject matter of the appeal remanded from 
the Utah Supreme Court, The changes proposed by the Rollers 
were justified as "clarifying" the intent of the court so as to 
eliminate the necessity of future hearings and friction between 
the parties. This is exactly the same posture as the change 
proposed by Cornish. Essentially, many of the amendments 
proposed by the Rollers were no different than the amendment 
proposed by Cornish; both were made for the purpose of further 
clarification and to resolve remaining disputes between the 
parties. 
The Rollers have mischaracterized the actions of the trial 
court. The addition made to Finding No. 5, proposed by Cornish/ 
did not constitute a reversal or modification of a previous 
finding. The issue raised by the proposed amendment had not 
previously been addressed by the trial court. The new finding 
made clear that while the tap in question was presently located 
fifty feet west of the Rollers' residence, an interpretation of 
the deed would not require that it remain in that position. 
The amendment simply clarifies the obligation of Cornish with 
respect to the deed. 
Rollers also claim that Amended Finding of Fact No. 5 is 
inconsistent with the trial court's original decree. This is 
erroneous as pointed out by the district court. The district 
court stated that the deed was silent as to where the 3/4 inch 
tap had to be placed and that all the deed required was that 
Cornish furnish the Rollers water from the Pearson spring 
through a 3/4 inch tap. The court also observed that while the 
previous decree may have simply stated as a factual predicate 
that the tap was presently located 50 feet west of the Roller 
residence, it was not a requirement of the deed or previous 
order that the tap remain there. (Transcript, p. 18) 
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The trial court's additional finding was also consistent 
with the Supreme Court's decision affirming the literal language 
of the deed. Cornish proposed the amendment to seek clarifica-
tion of its long term obligations under the deed in light of 
the Supreme Court's ruling in order to head off problems with 
the Rollers in the future. 
Furthermore, it is contrary to principles of judicial 
economy to assert that the same judge who has presided over 
this case for almost ten years could not make an additional 
finding of fact in an attempt to resolve another disputed issue 
between the same parties. The alternative would have required 
the filing of a new action to determine the location of the tap 
right. This would neither be in the interests of the efficient 
administration of justice or in the interests of the parties. 
The additional finding regarding the location of the 3/4 
inch tap,was clearly within the authority of the trial court. 
If the trial court had attempted to make additional findings 
contrary to the mandate of the Supreme Court on remand, that 
would be a different matter. However, that is not the case. 
The trial court instead considered an additional matter not 
previously addressed by this Court. 
This Court's decision made further consideration of the 
language of paragraph 5 logical and appropriate on remand. 
Where a judgment is reversed and remanded with instructions, 
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the case stands in the lower court precisely as it did before a 
trial was had in the first instance. Hidden Meadows 
Development Co. v. Mills, 590 P.2d 1244, 1248 (Utah 1979). 
Where as here, part of a nonseverable judgment is reversed, a 
final judgment is thereafter not present. Hutchins v. State, 
100 Idaho 661, 603 P.2d 995, 1000 (1979). Thus, contrary to 
Roller's assertion, there was no final judgment in effect upon 
remand. 
Lower courts are free to decide issues on remand so long as 
they were not decided on a prior appeal. Quern v. Jordan, 440 
U.S. 332, 347, n. 18 (1979). See 5 Am. Jur. 2d, Appeal and 
Error § 992 (1962). Any issue not disposed of on appeal is 
left open for the trial court's reconsideration on remand. 
Beltran v. Myers, 701 F 2d 91, 93 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 462 
U.S. 1134 (1983). In Hulihee v. Heirs of Hueu, 57 Haw. 387, 
556 P.2d.920 (1976), the court found that on remand, the trial 
court could determine findings of fact and conclusions of law, 
with respect to issues not dealt with by the appellate court 
and was not bound by its prior findings and conclusions. If 
additional facts are presented in further proceedings on 
remand, findings as to matters not passed on by the appellate 
court should be changed or modified in accordance with the 
trial court's determinations based on the entire record. Id. 
Furthermore, a trial court may, after remand, correct an error 
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in its original findings as to a matter not passed on by the 
appellate court. Blinzler v. Andrews, 95 Idaho 769, 519 P.2d 
438 (1973). In Blinzler, it was held not error where the trial 
court on remand used a different formula for computing rental 
value on land than that used in the original proceeding. Id. 
at 440. 
In Hutchings, supra, the court stated that where part of a 
nonseverable judgment is reversed, on remand the case is back 
to the situation before judgment was improvidently granted and 
the trial judge is free to retry any issues that had not been 
specifically passed upon on appeal. 603 P.2d at 1000. See 
also Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd. v. National Distillers 
and Chemical Corp., 354 F.2d 459 (2d Cir. 1965); Annot. Power 
of Trial Court, On Remand for Further Proceedings, To Change 
Prior Fact Findings as to Matter Not Passed Upon By Appellate 
Court, Without Receiving Further Evidence, 19 A.L.R.3d 502 
(1968). 
Here, the trial court was not bound by its prior statement 
in Finding of Fact No. 5. The trial court had power to modify 
or make an additional finding with respect to the location of 
the tap. 
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POINT TWO 
ROLLERS1 ARGUMENTS THAT THE DISTRICT COURT 
ERRED ARE ERRONEOUS. THIS COURT SHOULD 
AFFIRM THE DISTRICT COURT. 
A. The Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel is Inapplicable Here. 
The principal argument advanced by the Rollers is that the 
doctrine of issue preclusion bars the amendment of Finding of 
Fact No. 5.2 The doctrine of collateral estoppel does not bar 
the amendment. Collateral estoppel prevents the relitigation 
of issues in a second action that have been once litigated and 
determined in another action. Penrod v. Nu Creation Creme, 
Inc., 669 P.2d 873, 875 (Utah 1983). In this case, there is 
neither a second action nor a prior determination on the issue. 
In order for a prior decision to be used against a party to 
preclude further litigation of an issue by the party, four 
questions must be answered in the affirmative: (1) Was the 
issue decided in the prior adjudication identical with the one 
presented in the action in question?; (2) Was there a final 
^Rollers refers to issue preclusion as the doctrine of "res 
judicata." There are two branches of res judicata—claim 
preclusion and issue preclusion. The second branch, that of 
issue preclusion, is properly referred to as the doctrine of 
collateral estoppel. Copper State Thrift & Loan v. Bruno, 735 
P.2d 287, 289 (Utah App. 1987). See also State v. Ruscetta, 
742 P.2d 114 (Utah App. 1987). The Rollers argument is limited 
only to this second branch of the doctrine of res judicata. 
For purposes of clarity, respondents will use the term 
collateral estoppel rather than res judicata in their brief to 
address Rollers argument of issue preclusion. 
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judgment on the merits?; (3) Was the party against whom the 
plea is asserted a party or in privity with a party to the 
prior adjudication?; and (4) Was the issue in the first case 
completely, fully and fairly litigated? Searle Brothers v. 
Searle, 588 P.2d 689, 691 (Utah 1978). If any of these four 
elements are not satisfied, then collateral estoppel is not 
available. Baxter v. Utah Dept. of Transp., 705 P.2d 1167, 
1168 (Utah 1985). In this case, Rollers must establish that 
each of these requirements are met in order to apply the 
doctrine of res judicata. Three of the four requirements, 
however, are not present. 
1. The Trial Court Never Addressed the Issue of Where the 
Tap Should Be Located Prior to the November 15, 1988 Hearing. 
Collateral estoppel requires that the factual issue decided 
in the prior action is the same factual issue presented in the 
second action. Robertson v. Campbell, 674 P.2d 1226, 1230 
(Utah 1983). Additionally, the issue actually litigated in the 
first suit must have been essential to the resolution of that 
suit. Id. See Copper State Thrift & Loan v. Bruno, 735 P.2d 
387, 390 (Utah App. 1987). This Court has stated that the 
issues actually litigated in the first action must be "pre-
cisely the same as those raised in the instant action" in order 
to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Wilde v. 
Mid-Century Ins. Co., 635 P.2d 417, 419 (Utah 1981). See also 
Schaer v. State, 657 P.2d 1337, 1341 (Utah 1983). Collateral 
estoppel does not apply to issues that merely could have been 
tried in the prior case, but operates only to issues which were 
actually asserted and tried in that case. International 
Resources v. Dunfield, 599 P.2d 515, 517 (Utah 1979). 
Rollers are incorrect in their assertion that the issue of 
the location of the tap was litigated previously. In the 
original Findings of Fact, the court merely made a factual 
observation that the tap was 50 feet west of the residence. 
The judge did this because "you told me that's where it was." 
(Transcript, p.18.) The court did not address the issue of 
whether the deed required the tap to be located at that spot. 
This issue was never raised. The location of the tap did not 
become an issue until 1988. A fortiori, the location of the 
tap was not essential to the issues actually determined 
previously. 
The relevant question dealt with in the original Findings 
of Fact was whether Cornish had to provide the Rollers water 
specifically from the Pearson Springs. The prior findings do 
not purport to rule conclusively on the location of the tap. 
They simply express the obvious—where the tap was currently 
located. 
In Schaer v. State, supra, the landowner instituted a suit 
claiming that a road referred to as the "dugway road" was a 
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public thoroughfare. In a prior action in 1967, the plaintiff 
argued that condemnation would deprive him of access to the 
remainder of his property. The plaintiff had only a possi-
bility of access via the dugway road. The court made findings 
of fact that there was no reasonable access to the remaining 
property. In the subsequent action, the state argued that 
plaintiff's position in the 1967 litigation, that he was denied 
reasonable access to his remaining property, implied a finding 
that the dugway road was not a public thoroughfare and precluded 
him from thereafter maintaining to the contrary. This Court 
held that the prior action never focused on whether the dugway 
road was a public thoroughfare: 
The trial court's findings of fact . . . do not 
purport to rule conclusively on the status of the 
dugway road "for all time." They simply express the 
trial court's finding that, in 1967, there was no 
"reasonable," "economical," or "feasible" access 
available for use or development, nor was there a 
likelihood of such in "the foreseeable future." One 
of the uses for the land noted by the trial court was 
"speculative," and there is nothing in its findings to 
preclude another court twelve years later, from 
finding that access is now reasonable, economical, and 
feasible by way of the dugway road. In any event, 
neither the findings nor the judgment entered in the 
1967 case demonstrates that the court considered and 
ruled on the precise issue in this case, namely, 
whether the dugway road [was a public thoroughfare.] 
657 P.2d at 1341. Likewise, the court's prior Findings of Fact 
here never focused on the precise issue of whether the deed 
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required the tap to be located 50 feet west of the residence, 
which the court subsequently determined it did not. 
2. A Judgment Reversed on Appeal is Not Considered Final 
for Purposes of Collateral Estoppel. 
The April 26, 1984 judgment of the district court was 
reversed in part and remanded to the district court. A judg-
ment which is reversed on appeal is not considered final for 
purposes of collateral estoppel. Bruno, supra, 735 P.2d at 
390. In this case, there is no prior final judgment to be 
given preclusive effect. More importantly, there was no prior 
action. Collateral estoppel is designed to bar a second action 
on issues decided in a prior action. In this case, there was 
no second action but merely a continuation of the same case. 
3. The Issue of the Tap Location was not Fully, 
Completely and Fairly Litigated Previously. 
The doctrine of collateral estoppel also requires that the 
issue was completely, fully and fairly litigated in the first 
forum. Searle, supra, 588 P.2d at 691. In this case, the 
issue of the tap location was not litigated at all previously. 
Collateral estoppel applies, only to issues which were 
actually asserted and tried in a prior case. Dunfield, supra, 
599 P.2d at 517. If the material issue was not actually 
asserted and determined, there is no basis upon which it can be 
concluded that the party hac3 actually taken any position with 
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respect to the issue and should now be estopped from asserting 
a position in the present case. Dunfield, supra, 599 P.2d at 
517. The issue regarding interpretation of the deed with 
respect to the location of the tap was not asserted and tried 
earlier in this case and Cornish was appropriately not estopped 
from raising this on November 15, 1988. 
The Rollers cannot establish the elements of collateral 
estoppel to require a reversal of the trial court's interpreta-
tion of the deed with respect to the location of the tap. The 
trial court appropriately addressed the issue of the clarifica-
tion of the deed with respect to the location of the tap when 
it was raised for the first time at the hearing on November 15, 
1988. 
B. The Doctrine of Law of the Case Is Not Applicable Here; 
The Trial Court did not Modify or Reverse a Previous Legal 
Determination but Rather Made a New and Additional Finding 
Justified by the Circumstances. 
Rollers' argument that law of the case applies to prohibit 
the trial court from amending Finding of Fact No. 5 is 
erroneous. In the instant case, the same judge that has 
controlled the litigation over the course of several years, 
simply made an additional finding after hearing the arguments 
of counsel. 
The case of Wheeler v. City of Pleasant Grove, 746 F.2d 
1437 (11th Cir. 1984), cited by Rollers, is inapposite. In 
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that case, the district court entered new findings on remand 
inconsistent with the circuit court's opinion. The circuit had 
reversed the district court's prior ruling denying plaintiff's 
claim for damages and remanded for a determination of damages. 
On remand, the district court still refused to award damages. 
On a subsequent appeal, the circuit held that the district court 
improperly engaged in a de novo determination of the damage 
issue. The court held that it had previously found that the 
plaintiffs were entitled to damage and that the only question 
on remand was the amount of damages sustained. Id. at 1441. 
Law of the case bound the district court to award damages. 
The doctrine of law of the case is not applicable here. 
Under law of the case, a decision on an issue of law made at 
one stage of the proceeding becomes a binding precedent to be 
followed at successive stages of the same litigation. See 
Conder v; A.L. Williams & Associates, Inc., 739 P.2d 634, 636 
(Utah 1987). Since law of the case deals with the application 
of legal principles to particular facts, it does not prohibit a 
new factual finding not previously considered by the trial 
court. Law of the case encompasses only those issues actually 
previously determined. Wheeler, supra, 746 F.2d at 1440. See 
Moore's Federal Practice, 1f 0.404[1] at 117 (1988). Here, the 
trial court made a new factual finding. Cornish was not trying 
to have the court decide again an issue it had already decided. 
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While a decision of the appellate court establishes the law 
of the case which must be followed by the trial court on remand, 
this Court in the previous appeal did not decide any issue of 
law applicable to the narrow issue addressed by the trial court 
in amending Finding of Fact No. 5. Moreover, even if law of 
the case could be correctly applied to this case, which it 
cannot, law of the case applies only where the facts and issues 
are substantially the same at the time of the subsequent 
decision as they were at the time of the original decision. 
This Court has recognized that where new facts are adduced, law 
of the case may not be applicable. See Richardson v. Grand 
Central Corp., 572 P.2d 395, 397 (Utah 1977); see Board of 
Education v. Salt Lake County, 659 P.2d 1030, 1033 (Utah 1983). 
Unlike the court in Wheeler, in this case, the judge did 
not make a finding inconsistent with this Court's previous 
opinion. * The issue of the interpretation of the deed with 
respect to the location of the tap was not previously deter-
mined and thus, no law of the case had been established. 
Moreover, the mere recitation by way of background facts that 
the tap was located 50 feet west of the residence in the 
Findings of Fact entered in 1984, did not prohibit the court 
from addressing the issue of whether the deed required the tap 
to be located 50 feet west of the residence when it was raised 
in 1988. Facts and circumstances had changed in the four years 
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since the original decision and the trial judge, who was 
intimately familiar with the facts, appropriately did not 
consider himself bound by his prior observation in the Findings 
of Fact. 
C. Rollers' Reliance on Procedural Rules to Support Reversal 
of the District Court Is Misplaced. 
Rollers assert that Cornish violated Rule 4-501(7) of the 
Code of Judicial Administration. This rule indicates, however, 
that a motion shall be in writing "unless made during a 
hearing ..." The purpose of this rule is to prevent surprise 
and prejudice. In this case, the Rollers were certainly not 
prejudiced by the fact that this motion was made orally at the 
time of the omnibus hearing. Rollers responded to the motion, 
made their objections known to the court and had a full 
opportunity to be heard. 
The Rollers' assertion that Rule 52 and Rule 59(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure prohibited the Court from making 
the finding is also inapposite since these Rules contemplate a 
final proceeding. As previously set forth, once the Supreme 
Court remanded the case, the court was free to consider its 
prior order in light of this Court's decision. 
D. Rollers Were Not Deprived of Due Process by the Court's 
Amendment. 
Rollers assert for the first time on appeal that they were 
deprived of due process by the court's granting of Cornish's 
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oral motion to amend Finding of Fact No. 5. The Rollers are 
barred from raising this issue since it was not raised below. 
Issues not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the 
first time on appeal. See, e.g., Inslev Mfg. Corp. v. Draper 
Bank & Trust, 717 P.2d 1341, 1347 (Utah 1986); Trayner v. 
Cushing, 688 P.2d 856, 857 (Utah 1984). 
Even if the due process claim were appropriately raised on 
appeal, it should be denied. The Rollers clearly had an 
opportunity to be heard fully on the interpretation of the deed 
with respect to the location of the tap. The trial court's 
consideration of this issue took a substantial amount of time. 
(See Transcript, pp. 5-22.) Rollers1 counsel presented his 
best case as to why the deed should not be interpreted as 
Cornish contended. Counsel made numerous statements about the 
possible effect of the relocation of the tap on the quantity of 
water the Rollers would receive. The court considered the 
arguments of counsel and ruled against the Rollers. They 
should not now be heard to complain that they were denied due 
process. 
POINT THREE 
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE TRIAL COURT HAD 
POWER UNDER RULE 60(b) TO MODIFY ITS FORMER 
ORDER AND APPROPRIATELY DID SO IN THIS CASE 
IN LIGHT OF CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES. 
Rollers' assertion that the trial court had no power to 
make the modifications sought by Cornish to the Findings of 
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Fact for any reason except clerical error is incorrect. The 
Court has inherent equity power to modify or alter its prior 
orders and judgments and that power may be invoked by motion or 
by an independent action in equity. Cornish sought to have the 
court modify its prior order and make an additional finding. 
As set forth above, the trial court was empowered to make 
additional findings on remand since no final judgment was 
present. (See, Point One, supra) 
In the alternative, however, even if a final judgment was 
present, the trial court had power to revise its final order in 
circumstances contemplated by Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Rule 60(b) provides in relevant part that: 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court 
may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or 
his legal representative from a final judgment, order, 
or proceeding for the following reasons . . . . 
(6) . . . it is no longer equitable that the judgment 
should have prospective application; or (7) any other 
reasdn justifying relief from the operation of the 
judgment. 
Rule 60(b)(6)(7), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The trial court has power to modify its prior order pursuant 
to Rule 60(b)(6) to eliminate the inequitable prospective 
application of the court's order in light of changed circum-
stances. In any situation where a judgment has prospective 
application, relief may be given from its prospective features 
when subsequent events make it no longer equitable that the 
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judgment have prospective application. 7 Moore's Federal 
Practice, 1f 60.26[4] at 60-262 (1987). 
The trial court also had power to modify its prior order 
pursuant to Rule 60(b)(7). The rule allowing a trial court to 
grant relief from a judgment or order for "any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment" provides 
a reservoir of equitable power to do justice in a given case. 
The Court's power to alter or modify its prior orders and 
decrees is inherent. The rule contemplates relief that is 
equitable and just. The rule providing for relief from 
judgments should be liberally construed to enable courts to 
vacate or modify judgments whenever such action is necessary to 
accomplish justice. 0'Link v. O'Link, 632 P.2d 225 (Alaska 
1981). 
The thrust of Rule 60(b) is to allow the court that rendered 
the judgment opportunity to change it when significant new 
matters of fact or law arise which were not in existence at the 
time the original order was issued. See E.B. Jones Constr. Co. 
v. Denver, 717 P.2d 1009 (Colo. App. 1986). Granting of relief 
from judgment is appropriate where there has been a change of 
circumstances from those originally before the court. See, 
e.g., Boyce v. Boyce, 609 P.2d 928, 981 (Utah 1980). 
In McCormack v. McCormack, 45 Or. App. 1111, 610 P.2d 290 
(1980), the court reconsidered and amended a prior final 
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order. The court stated that the court had inherent power to 
set aside or correct a previous judgment, upon a showing of 
good cause to do so. Id. at 292. The court stated that the 
only limitation on the Court's inherent power to modify or 
correct a previous judgment is that this power should be exer-
cised within a reasonable time. What is reasonable time for 
this purpose is a matter within the discretion of the court. 
Id. 
Moreover, broad discretion is accorded the trial court in 
ruling on the merits of a motion for relief from a judgment and 
the Supreme Court will reverse that ruling only if it is clear 
that the trial court abused its discretion. Russell v. 
Martell, 681 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1984); Hall v. Fitzgerald, 671 
P.2d 224 (Utah 1983). The court may exercise wide judicial 
discretion in weighing the factors of fairness and prejudice to 
the parties. 
If this further finding by the trial court is construed as 
granting relief under Rule 60(b), it was clearly within the 
trial courts discretion to grant the relief requested by 
Cornish. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons outlined above, Cornish submits that the 
Court should affirm the amendment by the trial court to 
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Paragraph 5 of the Amended Findings of Fact dated December 15, 
1988. 
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